At the risk of adding to an already enormous reading list:

W.R. Mead's Special Providence is, in my opinion, the most articulate analysis of how American culture gets translated into foreign policy and how it's received overseas.

How Did This Happen?, put together by the editors of Foreign Affairs, ranges wider in terms of policy analysis. Richard Betts, for example, sets American intelligence successes in counter-terrorism besides the failures. Alan Wolfe, in a piece called "The Home Front," remarks on American pragmatism and, Jerry Falwell's crowd aside, a notable lack of hysteria. Presciently, Michael Mandelbaum describes the policy consequences of Sept. 11 as a sharp focusing of diplomacy, a loosening of restraints on the use of force, calls to tackle the causes of terror, and the urgent removal of certain types of government. Did Saddam get a proof?

The Age of Terror, co-edited by Strobe Talbott, has longer, more ruminative essays about American power and strategy. Two British historians--Paul Kennedy, now at Yale, and Niall Fergusson of Oxford University--play Athenians to the new Rome by turning to the past for lessons. Perhaps the outstanding essay here is from J.L. Gaddis, the dean of American diplomatic historians. He reflects from a height on America's foreign-policy failures in the 1990s and calls on it now to assume its world responsibilities more consistently.

Joseph Nye's The Paradox of American Power is about why an unrivalled military and economic power still needs allies or partners and why, as world leader, America should rely also on soft, persuasive kinds of power: the appeal of its values and culture. Even Nye's multilateralism is tempered, however. Without rebuffing international support, America should be ready to go it alone to protect vital interests or when cooperative solutions become recipes for inaction.

What We Think of America, is in another vein entirely. Ian Jack, editor of a London-based literary quarterly, asked 24 non-American writers across the world to describe what the U.S. means to them. Is America, he asked them, really so disliked? If so, why? You would be wrong to expect a set of anti-American sermonettes. With exceptions, these short pieces express admiration--even love--for Americans and American life. The ifs and buts are for American policies.

The story points out that Bush got a loan to buy stock in Harken Energy. This used to be considered a good thing, having employees, officers, and directors showing their dedication to their company by actually investing in their company.

But down in the third graf, the usually precise Allen wrote, incorrectly:

"Corporate loans to officers came under scrutiny after WorldCom . . . revealed it had lent nearly $400 million to Bernard J. Ebbers to buy the company's stock when he was chief executive. He resigned in April as the stock price tumbled."

Uh. No. Bernie Ebbers (as detailed in Mullings of May 1, 2002: "Greed") had bought a half billion dollars worth of companies for his own account and had pledged WorldCom stock to the banks as collateral.

When the stock price of WorldCom began to drop, the banks wanted more collateral. To avoid selling his WorldCom shares to cover his loans, or - perish the thought - selling the companies he had purchased, Ebbers convinced WorldCom to lend him $400 million.

In one case director Bush borrowed money from the corporation to invest IN the corporation. In the other case, CEO Ebbers borrowed money from his corporation to buy OTHER corporations - for himself.

There should be a sign here outside Miller Park that reads: "Game called on account of incompetence and indifference."

There are men who are suited to their period and rise to the occasion. And there are other men, no better or worse on the whole, who are painfully ill-suited to their times and the problems they face.

Selig is the latter. Anybody who can't see that, after the 11th inning on Tuesday night, just isn't paying attention.

Baseball acted just as it so often does. The managers were scared of their players. Oh, what if somebody gets a sore arm, what if some other manager gets mad at me. The commissioner was petrified to act like a leader and say, "Play one more inning, damn it, so we have time to prepare the crowd for what's going to happen."

Without the time to make 30 phone calls to reach a consensus, Selig was frozen. Oh, what will Don Fehr say if one of his precious dues-payers files a grievance because he got back to the hotel too late to order room service?

Actually, the farcical ending was so bad that it may actually bring some good. Every player and every owner heard those angry chants. The Brewers crowd usually only gets annoyed if the beer is warm or the bratwurst is cold.

Perhaps players (though it's a lot to hope) will think, "We owe the sport more than we're giving back. How can we demand respect if we don't respect the game itself?"

That's important because Bush's knowledge and intent are important elements of any "insider trading" allegations. If he didn't know about the bulk of the losses, and cleared the stock sale through the lawyers first, then there's no way he could have had the evil intent his critics claim he had.

It's an album of lust, spirituality, and empowerment; and it's an album which will undoubtedly increase the world's population as a result of its mere existence.